The Rome Statute, the founding statute of the International Criminal Court, is the first international statute to codify an environment centric war crime. While several international institutions have previously explored the phenomenon of environmental damage during a war, this has always been restricted to situations where the ultimate harm was caused to civilian populations.
Therefore, the notion of an environmental crime came to be inherently linked with its potential to damage the human population. This approach trivialized the harm done to the environment, and neglected any act which did not have a consequent effect on civilians. This paper seeks to analyse the provisions of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) which removes the sine qua non of human damage, and provides a cause of action grounded in environmental damage alone. Through the course of this paper, the author would be tracing the legislative history behind the provision, analysing the contextual elements of Article 8(2)(b)(iv), and highlighting the exacting standard enshrined under this provision.